
In April 2026, a decision by the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of New York barred Jones Day from serving as counsel to Vanderbilt Minerals, LLC in Chapter 11, citing concerns that a law firm representing a corporate family for over a decade may have conflicting interests.
This decision relied on § 327(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. However, the issue has been addressed for thirty years by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, bar ethics committees, and academic literature under the heading of corporate-family conflicts.
Corporate groups often use one outside firm across the parent, its subsidiaries, and its affiliates. This arrangement continues until the interests of two family members diverge over an intercompany claim, an investigation, or the distress of one entity. At this point, the firm’s familiarity with the family may become the ground on which it may be barred from acting for one member against another.
This article outlines this framework and examines why it did not resolve In re Vanderbilt Minerals, LLC.
Vanderbilt Minerals’ Bankruptcy Filing and Jones Day’s Role
Vanderbilt Minerals filed for Chapter 11 on February 16, 2026, facing over 1,400 talc-related cases, with more than 150 scheduled for trial that year. They applied to retain Jones Day as debtor’s counsel under § 327(a).
As detailed in Chief Judge Wendy A. Kinsella’s April 27 memorandum decision, the firm’s relationship with the Vanderbilt companies began in 2011, when it represented R.T. Vanderbilt Company and assisted with the restructuring that produced Vanderbilt Minerals and its parent, R.T. Vanderbilt Holding Company Inc.
Subsequently, the firm represented the debtor, the parent, and certain nondebtor affiliates on corporate and governance matters.
Two engagements in the two years before the filing proved decisive.
In October 2024, Jones Day represented Vanderbilt Minerals, the parent, and Vanderbilt Chemicals, LLC in evaluating a transfer of the VEEGUM processing facility from Chemicals to Vanderbilt Minerals, which did not occur.
In the spring of 2025, the firm advised Vanderbilt Minerals and its affiliates in a global netting exercise, resulting in approximately $127.3 million owed from the parent to Vanderbilt Minerals, subject to reconciliation and offset.
Jones Day ended its representation of the parent and affiliates in September 2025 and thereafter represented only Vanderbilt Minerals.
By the petition date, an independent manager with separate counsel was responsible for investigating intercompany matters and negotiating a settlement under which the debtor would release intercompany claims in exchange for asset transfers, including the VEEGUM facility.
The court found this separation insufficient. It found no misconduct, stated that it was “not questioning the competence or integrity” of the firm, and accepted that the independent manager had negotiated the settlement without the firm’s involvement.
The difficulty was that the firm had advised entities on both sides of transactions now central to the estate, and the court held that it should not have to evaluate the merits of those transactions, or the debtor’s solvency when they occurred, to find the firm free of conflict. The independent manager, in the court’s words, did not “disentangle” a relationship that had lasted over a decade.
Ethical Rules Governing Corporate-Family Conflicts
Outside bankruptcy, the issue Vanderbilt raises is governed by Model Rules 1.7, 1.9, and 1.13, along with related opinions and commentary.
Rule 1.13(a) establishes the entity theory: a lawyer retained by an organization represents the organization, not its constituents.
Comment [34] to Rule 1.7 extends this principle to affiliates.
A lawyer representing a corporation does not automatically represent its parent or subsidiary. They are not barred from representing an affiliate in an unrelated matter, subject to three exceptions:
when the affiliate should also be considered a client, when the lawyer and the organization agree to avoid adverse representations to affiliates, and when the lawyer’s obligations to either the organization or the new client would “likely limit materially” the representation of the other.
Comment [34] was added in the Ethics 2000 revisions, largely based on American Bar Association (“ABA”) Formal Opinion 95-390, which remains foundational.
This opinion rejected a per se rule in either direction and identified circumstances where an affiliate becomes a de facto client:
when client and affiliate are alter egos, when the lawyer has received confidential information from or about the affiliate while representing the client, and when a single legal department retains and supervises counsel for both.
Even if the affiliate is not a client, a representation may be barred if its financial impact on the client compromises the lawyer’s judgment.
The opinion, repeated by ethics committees, emphasizes the need for a clear understanding at the outset about which entities in the family are the lawyer’s clients or will be treated as such for conflicts purposes.
The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers takes a similar stance. It recognizes that representing a client’s affiliate adversely may require the client’s consent if the impact on the client is material. It also directs that conflicts among affiliates be analyzed based on the entities being separate.
Charles Wolfram’s article on corporate-family conflicts, later relied upon by the New York City Bar, criticizes the “no-affiliates” and “all-affiliates” positions as extreme. He advocates for a functional analysis focused on the client’s reasonable expectations of confidentiality, a smooth working relationship with counsel, and the operational proximity between the lawyer’s work and the affiliate.
Substantial Relationship Test and Affiliate Representation
Later commentary interprets Comment [34]’s reference to an “unrelated” matter as incorporating the substantial-relationship test. This means a lawyer is barred from acting adversely to an affiliate in a matter substantially related to work done for the client, even if the affiliate was never a client.
The current-client analysis under Rule 1.7 shifts to Rule 1.9. This rule bars a lawyer from representing another person in the same or a substantially related matter adverse to a former client without informed consent. It also prohibits using the former client’s confidential information to their disadvantage.
Under the ethics rules, the questions were whether representing the debtor in a case centered on settling intercompany claims was substantially related to advising the parent and affiliates on the netting exercise and the VEEGUM transfer. Another question was whether the parent’s consent, typically given by a settlement counterparty, resolved the issue.
Courts applying these rules generally disfavor curing a conflict by dropping one client to keep another, known as the hot potato rule. However, Comment [5] to Rule 1.7 allows withdrawal from one representation if unforeseeable developments, like a change in corporate affiliation, create the conflict.
Two additional features of the Model Rules directly relate to the Vanderbilt facts.
The first concerns common representation.
In the VEEGUM evaluation and the netting exercise, the firm acted for several family members simultaneously. The comments to Rule 1.7 address this separately:
the lawyer must remain impartial among the commonly represented clients, should inform each client at the outset that information will be shared, and should advise that the attorney-client privilege typically does not apply between commonly represented clients.
If the common representation fails due to irreconcilable client interests, the lawyer usually must withdraw from representing all clients.
The second feature directly addresses loyalty.
Loyalty Concerns and Self-Evaluation in Legal Representation
ABA Formal Opinion 497 concluded that a lawyer attacking work they performed for a former client in the same or a substantially related matter is materially adverse under Rule 1.9(a), even if the former client is not a party to the later matter.
Investigating intercompany claims by debtor’s counsel essentially questions whether the netting exercise and transfer analysis benefited the debtor. The firm advising on both would be evaluating its own work.
Rule 1.7 reaches the same point from the side of the current client, providing that a lawyer’s own interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on the representation and that “if the probity of a lawyer’s own conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client detached advice.”
The former-client conflict is imputed to every lawyer in the firm under Rule 1.10(a), so it cannot be avoided by assigning the debtor’s engagement to lawyers who did not handle the affiliate work.
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