
A heated exchange occurred in the Supreme Court during a hearing on the singing of Vande Mataram, where Solicitor General Tushar Mehta suggested that law-making could not be dictated by Naxalites, prompting a strong objection from Senior Advocate Dr. S. Muralidhar.
Words Overrule the Bench
The argument took place before a Bench led by Chief Justice of India Surya Kant and Justice Joymalya Bagchi. The Solicitor General made the statement that law-making cannot be dictated by Naxalites, and he repeated it after Dr. Muralidhar asked for it to be withdrawn, insisting he was not sorry for the comment.
Dr. Muralidhar argued that the remark was unnecessary and unbecoming of a law officer, noting that the hearing was live and decorum must be maintained. Senior Advocate Sanjay Hegde interjected, suggesting that thinking critically is not the same as being a Naxalite.
Justice Bagchi observed that the Court had not taken note of the remark. The Solicitor General later clarified that his point was that legislative decision-making must take place within the constitutional framework and cannot be dictated through arms or violence, adding that he did not know why the remark had been taken personally.
Constitutional Courts and Respect
The Solicitor General submitted that the comment was directed at those who do not respect the constitutional law-making process, rather than at the petitioner or his counsel. Justice Bagchi observed that the Court has continuously fought against extra-constitutional forces and that the Solicitor General’s commitment to the Constitution required it to defeat such forces.
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Justice Bagchi added a reflection on why litigants turn to constitutional courts, noting that they command respect and credibility because even a person accused of terrorism is tried according to law. The judge stated that until that process is followed, nobody can raise a finger.
This exchange occurred during the hearing of T.M. Krishna’s petition challenging the Centre’s circular on the singing of six stanzas of Vande Mataram and the extension of the Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971 to the song. The Bench indicated it would examine the challenge to the extent penal consequences are involved, making clear that it is not for the courts to declare what constitutes the National Song.
Sharp words between the bench, the bar, and the government’s law officers are not unknown in high-profile constitutional cases. The significance of such an exchange lies less in the heat of the moment than in how it is handled. The objection was registered, the Solicitor General stood by his words while clarifying their scope, and the Bench expressly recorded that it had not taken note of the remark, an indication that the Court did not treat it as bearing on the legal issue before it.
The disagreement is a matter of courtroom decorum, distinct from the constitutional question the Court is examining. Nothing in the exchange decides, or bears upon, the merits of the Vande Mataram challenge, which the Bench indicated it would take up to the extent it involves penal consequences. Dr. Muralidhar and the Solicitor General thus engaged in a debate about the limits of free speech and the role of the Court in protecting it, with the Bench ultimately deciding to focus on the legal issue at hand.
The Court’s decision to examine the challenge to the extent penal consequences are involved is a significant development in the case. The Bench’s indication that it would not declare what constitutes the National Song suggests that the Court is exercising restraint in its judgment, recognizing the complexities of the issue.
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