Ghana Debates Voting Rights for Convicts

Ghana’s Supreme Court unanimously upheld a five-year voting ban for people convicted of electoral offenses, ruling that Parliament may restrict the constitutional right to vote beyond the limits written into the Constitution, 1992. The decision in Fred Akweter v. Attorney General & Electoral Commission rejected a challenge by Akweter, a Ghanaian lawyer, who had argued that the franchise can be limited only on the grounds the Constitution itself names: citizenship, age, and soundness of mind.

The case is of constitutional significance because it challenges the Representation of the People Act, 1992 on the grounds that its provisions unjustly deprive certain citizens of Ghana of their fundamental right to be registered as voters or to participate in elections.

The Akweter case centered on whether the constitutionally guaranteed right to vote can lawfully be restricted by Parliament beyond those expressly stated in Article 42 of the Constitution, 1992. Article 42 provides that “every citizen of Ghana of eighteen years of age or above and of sound mind has the right to vote and is entitled to be registered as a voter for the purposes of public elections and referenda.”

Akweter argued that Sections 27, 28, 29, 36, and 41 of the Representation of the People Act, 1992 are inconsistent with the Constitution. These provisions mandate the courts to suspend the voting rights of persons convicted of the relevant offenses for five years from the date of completing their terms of imprisonment.

It was Akweter’s argument that the right to vote under Article 42 of the Constitution, 1992 is a fundamental and inalienable entitlement guaranteed to all Ghanaian citizens aged eighteen and above of sound mind, and that this right comprises both the procedural right to register and the substantive right to cast a ballot.

The Attorney General acknowledged the centrality of the right to vote in Ghana’s constitutional order, describing it as a foundational pillar of democracy and a fundamental entitlement of every qualified citizen, but emphasized that like all rights, it is not absolute. Citing Article 12 of the Constitution, the Attorney General argued that rights may be lawfully limited where such restrictions are necessary, proportionate, and serve the public interest.

The Court delivered its lead judgment through His Lordship Dennis Dominic Adjei, who stated:

We are satisfied that the restrictions were properly made on a right to vote and to be registered as a voter under the universal adult suffrage, the restriction was made with a legitimate aim to disenfranchise the citizens convicted of the impugned crimes to prevent crimes involving some electoral offenses to ensure that democratic regime is preserved to function to promote civic responsibility and respect for rule of law, and the five-year disqualification from elections or public elections as the case may be is proportional to the offenses concerned.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Akweter carries significant implications for Ghanaian democracy. By upholding the five-year disenfranchisement of electoral offenders, the Court reinforced Parliament’s authority to enact laws to restrict or limit the rights of Ghanaian citizens and the Electoral Commission to regulate elections.

Ghana’s approach to this subject has not been any different from other jurisdictions. Justice Adjei demonstrated knowledge of international law in giving his judgment, referencing the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights to which Ghana is a signatory, noting the importance of human rights in the electoral process.

The UN Human Rights Committee addressed these limits in General Comment No. 25. At paragraph 10, the Committee stated that the right to vote must be grounded in law and may carry only reasonable restrictions, such as a minimum voting age, and that any restriction must be fair and reasonable to achieve a legitimate aim.

Parliament has the right to enact laws to restrict rights which are not absolute, including the right to vote or being registered as a voter, but the restrictions shall be fair and reasonable to achieve a legitimate aim, and the restriction shall be proportional to the offense for which a citizen was convicted, thus maintaining the balance between individual rights and the democratic process.